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1. Research Questions 
 
 What is the interaction? 
 
 
 Could the developing countries improve their industry’s 
competitiveness by managing the interactions? 
 
 
  If they can, which path should the developing countries adopt?  
 
 
 What policy should the governments of developing countries 
choose when there are conflictions between market structure and 




Market structure and technological innovation  
 
    Cohen and Levin (1989) 
 
    the most notable feature of the empirical research on the relationship 
between firm size and innovation is its inconclusiveness,  
     but the majority of studies that examine the relationship between 
market concentration and R&D have found a positive relationship and 
few have found evidence that concentration has a negative effect on 
R&D. 
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market structure and technological innovation 
• Theoretical support : 




   The simulation models of Nelson and Winter (1982) devised a 
formal structure to demonstrate the connections that link 






3． Two alternative paths for later-
comer to acquire competitive advantage 
two paths:  
 Setting up of large innovative enterprises under strong 
government support .   (Korea, Japan) 
 
 spontaneous atomistic firms which are supported by 
relative institutions with high innovative capacity. (Taiwan) 
 
   Technological innovation plays an important role in both paths. It might 
be not feasible if independent innovation is neglected and the later 
comers rely on foreign technology.  
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large innovative enterprises under strong government 
support --- Korea 
 
 In the 1970s, The Korean government intentionally created 
large firms (Kim, 1993). 
 
 The deliberate promotion of big business as an engine of 
technological learning, achieved through a systematic and 
comprehensive array of subsidies and incentives (Kim, 1997).  
 
 Most importantly, the Cheabols took an independent and 
reverse engineering technological strategic route in early years 
of catching up and the Korean government restricted FDI but 
promoted instead technology transfer through other means  
(Kim, 1993). 
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Atomistic firms which are supported by relative institutions 
with high innovative capacity---Taiwan 
 
 
 The superlative network of technology support institutions gives the 
Taiwanese small enterprises the backup they need to keep pace with 
technological change（Kim, Nelson, 2000).  
 
 Government-sponsored research institutions are critical to technology 
development and diffusion in Taiwan (How, Gee, 1993). Taiwan SMEs 
rely heavily on the efforts of the government to develop technology or 
on government sponsored research institutions to transfer technology 
to them.  
 
 
But this path gives it more flexibility but less depth in technology 
generation. As the industrial sector approaches technological frontiers, 
this may prove a disadvantage (Kim, Nelson, 2000). 
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4. Two Chinese cases of neglecting the 
important role of technological innovation 
on market structure and competitive 
advantages  
• Chinese Automobile Industry 
 
• Chinese Cosmetics industry 
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Chinese automobile industry 
 1953  
 
 After 1986, the Chinese government Policy: 
encouraging  joint development with foreign companies 
according the policy of “High starting point, high-volume, 
specialization” 






1986    9,000  
2006 3,860,000 
Registered Cars Which are made







Chinese automobile industry 
The big joint venture firms became the vassals of multinationals .  
 
     
• Those policies had a fatal flaw that the government did not require the 
Chinese enterprises to improve their own learning and researching 
capabilities and the Chinese firms even lost their old R&D platform during 
the process of the inflowing of foreign capital（Lu, 2004） 
 
 
• Those policies aimed only at high industrial concentration and never 
emphasized the importance of indigenous technological innovation capacity, 
which resulted in the reliance on the foreign technology and the lack of 
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Chinese automobile industry 
  After 2001, some independent domestic firms are emerging 
such as Chery, Geely, Brilliance, Hafei etc. But the established 




• Could the domestic firms grow up and have the  capabilities to compete 
with the multinationals? 
 
• What should government do to promote the development of those 
infant domestic firms?  
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Chinese Cosmetic industry 
    
 
   Since the opening up and the reform of China in the 
1978, the history of the development of Chinese 
cosmetic industry is a history that a large number of 
small enterprises kept on trying to challenge the 
multinational but mostly failed. 
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Chinese Cosmetics industry 
 Before 1982, there were 1300 cosmetic enterprises and the market 
concentration rate was low. 
 
 
 The United States Procter & Gamble, Unilever United Kingdom, 
Germany-Higher entered the Chinese market in succession after 1982 
and a large amount of Chinese domestic cosmetic firms have gone 




 After 1996, some Chinese domestic cosmetic firms found their niche 
market, such as Aoni, Manting, Sunrana, Softto, and Troy etc.  
 
 But most of the domestic enterprises were just a flash in the pan and 
after 2002, the Chinese domestic cosmetic firms slumped and the 








• what should the government do to promote the growing up 
of small domestic firms? 
 
•     To what extent should the government support the 
institutions to ensure domestic firms to grow up under the 
condition of multinationals dominating the market? 
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5．The model 
• We will refer to the History-friendly model (Marlerba, Nelson, Orsennigo, 




•  there are only two kinds of firms in the market including multinationals 
and domestic firms.  
 
• Both multinationals and domestic firms had their specific preferences to 
improve cheapness and performance and the preferences are determined for 
each firm at the start by a draw on the uniform distribution.  
 
  (For each firm, the preference to improve cheapness isθ1  and the preference to 
improve performance isθ2 =1-θ1. ) 
 
• When the multinationals entered the market, they had obviously advantage 
on technology especially on product performance.  
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 Suppose:  
 
• Multinationals can acquire technology without cost from parent 
companies . The probability of acquiring technology of each firm in each 
period subjects to the normal distribution（N（λ(t), σ2）.  
 
• Domestic firms acquire technology by its own Research and development 
expenditures.  
   ΔXi=a0(Ri)
a1(Xmax-Xi)
a2 ,        i=1,2  
      
 (X1，X2  denote the attributes of Cheapness and performance respectively, 
For each period, R is the R&D expenditure and R=ф*πt, where R is 




•  For each domestic firm, Ri =θiR . Price is obtained by adding a mark-up of 
cost: p=k(1+μt)，  
     
   (here μt=0.1+0.1*mi. k is the production cost andμt is the mark up 
which is initially set equal for all the firms but it then grows over time 





• Form period to period, the quality of the design that a company is able to 







• The probability that any customer will consider a particular product for 
purchase in a particular period is: 
 





6．The simulation runs 
6.1 Government does not intervene in firms 
• suppose there are 6 multinationals and 100 domestic firms in a 
market. The multinationals have technology advantage on 
performance but their products are more expensive than the 




• suppose that multinationals can get technology from their parent 
companies and domestic firms can only get technology by its own 
R&D.  
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Government does not intervene in firms        
Figure 1 
Fig 1 depict the evolutionary process of a mature industry. 
 After several periods of running, the domestic firms will lost their market  
and multinationals will take up the whole market (Fig 1).     
 (stochastic result)  
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6.2 Government directly fund the R&D of 
large domestic firms 
• In this part, we suppose that the government of domestic firms will fund the 
R&D of the comparatively large domestic firms when they find that the 
market share of domestic firms decline rapidly under the parameter 
condition of Fig 1. 
 
 
• the government will fund the top three domestic firms which have the 
highest market share at the end of period 5. The government will 
continuously sponsor those firms for 10 periods. After period 15, the 
government will stop funding them. 
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The domestic firms might get competitive advantage by the government’s research 
 and development investment when the amount of funds is big enough (Fig 2).  
The market structure will not change when the government fund is equal to  
10000 while the domestic firm can defeat the multinationals when 
 the government fund is equal to 100000 (Fig2).       (stochastic result) 
Figure 2 
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6.3 Government offer technological support 
to the small domestic firms. 
• In this part, we suppose that the government will offer technological support 
to the small domestic firms through research institutions. All the domestic 
firms in the market can get technology randomly from the government 
supported research institutions.  
 
 
• the probability of acquiring technology of each firm in each period subjects 




• The government will start to offer the technological support from the period 
5 and the initial parameters are the same as those used in Figure 1. 
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• Some domestic firms may catch up the multinationals if the research 
institutions which have strong research capabilities can offer new 
technology to them for free (Fig3).  










• For the later comer countries, the most important factor is the 
capability of technological innovation. Whether the market structure 
is dispersed or concentrated, the later comer countries should try to 
acquire the capability of continuous innovation first of all.  
 
 
• The industry competitive advantage could be acquired through 




• The domestic firms can get competitive advantages through the 
government’s R&D investment when the amount of the funds is big 
enough. the installing of large firms does not mean having 
competitiveness. Only the big firms which have high innovative 
capacities can compete with multinationals. If the late comers try to 
rapid establish large firms by foreign technology but neglect the 
capability of innovation and learning, the results may be 
counterproductive. 
 
• it is hard for the small domestic firms in mature industries of later 
comers to acquire competitive advantages.  But it is feasible for 
later-comer’ governments offer technology support to the small firms 
to acquire competitive advantage under appropriate conditions. 
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